Here is a list of the reading material in my possession and where it
was located:
Apparently, Alemon and Nyman have a
distorted view of what constitutes "anti-government" and
"anti-police". Notwithstanding their hyperbolic and exaggerated
interpretation of my reading material genre, it was in-fact
police working for government who violated my rights, beat, and
shocked me. Of course, to be accurate, it was ignorant, violent,
oppressive, and lying men in costumes who used their delusional
belief in being morally or lawfully superior to others by virtue
of the color of their clothes, or possession of weapons which
harmed me. Police and government are fictions, and possess no
conscience. Alemon and Nyman, concordantly, are flesh who choose
not to embrace their conscience, or have instead adopted despots
as their external conscience.
Analysis of charges, in the order of they allegedly occurred.
Improper Lane Usage (Probable cause for the initial stop).
The report states that, "As I continued to follow the vehicle, I
observed it to begin to weave within its own traffic lane, going
from the outer far line to the inner far dash line on several
occasions. Believing the driver of the vehicle to be
intoxicated, I activated my overhead lights in an attempt to
conduct a vehicle stop." The statute below at (a) states
"...within a single lane..." which is what the report confirms,
"...within its own traffic lane..."
(625 ILCS 5/11-709) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-709)
Sec. 11-709. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any
roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for
traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent
herewith shall apply.
(a)
A vehicle shall be driven
as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall
not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
(b) Upon a roadway which is divided into 3 lanes and provides
for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven
in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another
vehicle traveling in the same direction when such center lane is
clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for
making a left turn or where such center lane is at the time
allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction
that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated
by official traffic control devices.
(c) Official traffic control devices may be erected directing
specific traffic to use a designated lane or designating those
lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction
regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles
shall obey the directions of every such device. On multi-lane
controlled access highways with 3 or more lanes in one direction
or on any multi-laned highway with 2 or more lanes in one
direction, the Department may designate lanes of traffic to be
used by different types of motor vehicles. Drivers must obey
lane designation signing except when it is necessary to use a
different lane to make a turning maneuver.
(d) Official traffic control devices may be installed
prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway and
drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such
device.
(Source: P.A. 84-1311.)
Fleeing/attempting to
elude.
(625 ILCS 5/11-204) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-204)
Sec. 11-204. Fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.
(a) Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been
given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing
such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop,
willfully fails or refuses to
obey such direction,
increases his speed,
extinguishes his
lights, or otherwise
flees or attempts to elude the
officer, is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor. The signal given by the peace officer may be by
hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer
giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and,
if driving a vehicle, such vehicle shall display illuminated
oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when
used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate
the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.
Such requirement shall not preclude the use of amber or white
oscillating, rotating or flashing lights in conjunction with red
or blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights as required in
Section 12-215 of Chapter 12.
(b) Upon receiving notice of such conviction the Secretary of
State shall suspend the drivers license of the person so
convicted for a period of not more than 6 months for a first
conviction and not more than 12 months for a second conviction.
(c) A third or subsequent violation of this Section is a Class 4
felony.
(Source: P.A. 93-120, eff. 1-1-04.)
Resisting Peace Officer
(720 ILCS 5/4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-3)
Sec. 4-3. Mental state.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense
which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each
element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts
while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4--4
through 4--7.
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular
mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without
distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental
state applies to each such element. If the statute does not
prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of
an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute
liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4--4, 4--5 or
4--6 is applicable.
(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or
knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the
statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense
unless the statute clearly defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-4)
Sec. 4-4. Intent.
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to
accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the
statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or
purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-5)
Sec. 4-5. Knowledge.
A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct,
described by the statute defining the offense, when he is
consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that
such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes
awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct, described by the statute defining
the offense, when he is consciously aware that such result is
practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed
willfully, within the meaning of a statute using the latter
term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-6)
Sec. 4-6. Recklessness.
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by
the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation. An act performed
recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a
statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly
requires another meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-7)
Sec. 4-7. Negligence.
A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when he fails to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances
exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining
the offense; and such failure constitutes a substantial
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person
would exercise in the situation.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/4-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-8)
Sec. 4-8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or
mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided
in Section 4-3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the
existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with
respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not
constitute an offense is a defense if:
(1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or
order which is not known to him and has not been published or
otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not
have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence
pursuant to facts known to him; or
(2) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined
to be invalid; or
(3) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois
Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court
later overruled or reversed;
(4) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the
statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a
public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such
statute.
(c) Although a person's
ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief,
described in this Section 4--8 is a defense to the offense
charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he
would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this
Section 4--8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/31-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 31-1)
Sec. 31-1. Resisting or
obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional
institution employee.
(a) A person who knowingly
resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person
to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution
employee of any authorized act within his official capacity
commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(a-5) In addition to any other sentence that may be imposed, a
court shall order any person convicted of resisting or
obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional
institution employee to be sentenced to a minimum of 48
consecutive hours of imprisonment or ordered to perform
community service for not less than 100 hours as may be
determined by the court. The person shall not be eligible for
probation in order to reduce the sentence of imprisonment or
community service.
(a-7) A person convicted for a violation of this Section whose
violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace
officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee is
guilty of a Class 4 felony.
(b) For purposes of this Section, "correctional institution
employee" means any person employed to supervise and control
inmates incarcerated in a penitentiary, State farm, reformatory,
prison, jail, house of correction, police detention area,
half-way house, or other institution or place for the
incarceration or custody of persons under sentence for offenses
or awaiting trial or sentence for offenses, under arrest for an
offense, a violation of probation, a violation of parole, or a
violation of mandatory supervised release, or awaiting a bail
setting hearing or preliminary hearing, or who are sexually
dangerous persons or who are sexually violent persons; and
"firefighter" means any individual, either as an employee or
volunteer, of a regularly constituted fire department of a
municipality or fire protection district who performs fire
fighting duties, including, but not limited to, the fire chief,
assistant fire chief, captain, engineer, driver, ladder person,
hose person, pipe person, and any other member of a regularly
constituted fire department. "Firefighter" also means a person
employed by the Office of the State Fire Marshal to conduct
arson investigations.
(c) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this Section
if a person resists or obstructs the performance of one known by
the person to be a firefighter by returning to or remaining in a
dwelling, residence, building, or other structure to rescue or
to attempt to rescue any person.
(Source: P.A. 95-801, eff. 1-1-09.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-5)
Sec. 7-5. Peace officer's use of force in making arrest. (a) A
peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to
assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a
lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to
the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he
reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of
any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend
himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or
great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to
himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes
both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being
defeated by resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a
forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened
infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by
use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will
endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested
without delay.
(b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid
warrant is justified in the use of any force which he would be
justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows
that the warrant is invalid.
(Source: P.A. 84-1426.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-7)
Sec. 7-7. Private person's use of force in resisting arrest. A
person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which
he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private
person summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the
arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the
arrest in fact is unlawful.
(Source: P.A. 86-1475.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-8)
Sec. 7-8. Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
(a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm,
within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6 includes:
(1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the person to be
arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great
bodily harm; and
(2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to
be arrested is riding.
(b) A peace officer's discharge of a firearm using ammunition
designed to disable or control an individual without creating
the likelihood of death or great bodily harm shall not be
considered force likely to cause death or great bodily harm
within the meaning of Sections 7-5 and 7-6.
(Source: P.A. 90-138, eff. 1-1-98.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-13)
Sec. 7-13. Necessity.
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by
reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in
occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed
such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury
greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his
own conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
(720 ILCS 5/7-14) (from Ch. 38, par. 7-14)
Sec. 7-14. Affirmative defense. A defense of justifiable use of
force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this
Article is an affirmative defense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)
No Valid Drivers License
(625 ILCS 5/6-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-101)
Sec. 6-101. Drivers must have licenses or permits.
(a) No
person, except those expressly exempted by Section 6-102,
shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in
this State unless such person has a valid license or permit,
or a restricted driving permit, issued under the provisions of
this Act.
(b) No
person shall drive a motor vehicle unless he holds a valid
license or permit, or a restricted driving permit issued under
the provisions of
Section 6-205,
6-206, or
6-113 of this Act. Any person to whom a license is issued
under the provisions of this Act must surrender to the Secretary
of State all valid licenses or permits. No drivers license shall
be issued to any person who holds a valid Foreign State license,
identification card, or permit unless such person first
surrenders to the Secretary of State any such valid Foreign
State license, identification card, or permit.
(b-5) Any person who commits a violation of subsection (a) or
(b) of this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, if at
the time of the violation the person's driver's license or
permit was cancelled under clause
(a)9 of Section 6-201 of this Code.
(c) Any person licensed as a driver hereunder shall not be
required by any city, village, incorporated town or other
municipal corporation to obtain any other license to exercise
the privilege thereby granted.
(d) In addition to other penalties imposed under this Section,
any person in violation of this Section who is also in violation
of Section 7-601 of this Code relating to mandatory insurance
requirements shall have his or her motor vehicle immediately
impounded by the arresting law enforcement officer. The motor
vehicle may be released to any licensed driver upon a showing of
proof of insurance for the motor vehicle that was impounded and
the notarized written consent for the release by the vehicle
owner.
(e) In addition to other penalties imposed under this Section,
the vehicle of any person in violation of this Section who is
also in violation of Section 7-601 of this Code relating to
mandatory insurance requirements and who, in violating this
Section, has caused death or personal injury to another person
is subject to forfeiture under Sections 36-1 and 36-2 of the
Criminal Code of 1961. For the purposes of this Section, a
personal injury shall include any type A injury as indicated on
the traffic accident report completed by a law enforcement
officer that requires immediate professional attention in either
a doctor's office or a medical facility. A type A injury shall
include severely bleeding wounds, distorted extremities, and
injuries that require the injured party to be carried from the
scene.
(Source: P.A. 94-993, eff. 1-1-07; 95-578, eff. 6-1-08.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-102)
Sec. 6-102. What persons are exempt. The following persons are
exempt from the requirements of Section 6-101 and are not
required to have an Illinois drivers license or permit if one or
more of the following qualifying exemptions are met and apply:
1. Any employee of the United States Government or any member of
the Armed Forces of the United States, while operating a motor
vehicle owned by or leased to the United States Government and
being operated on official business need not be licensed;
2. A nonresident who has in his immediate possession a valid
license issued to him in his home state or country may operate a
motor vehicle for which he is licensed for the period during
which he is in this State;
3. A nonresident and his spouse and children living with him who
is a student at a college or university in Illinois who have a
valid license issued by their home State.
4. A person operating a road machine temporarily upon a highway
or operating a farm tractor between the home farm buildings and
any adjacent or nearby farm land for the exclusive purpose of
conducting farm operations need not be licensed as a driver.
5. A
resident of
this State who has been serving as a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States outside the Continental limits of
the United States, for a period of 45 days following his return
to the continental limits of the United States.
6. A nonresident on active duty in the Armed Forces of the
United States who has a valid license issued by his home state
and such nonresident's spouse, and dependent children and living
with parents, who have a valid license issued by their home
state.
7. A nonresident who becomes a resident of this State, may for a
period of the first 90 days of residence in Illinois operate any
motor vehicle which he was qualified or licensed to drive by his
home state or country so long as he has in his possession, a
valid and current license issued to him by his home state or
country. Upon expiration of such 90 day period, such new
resident must comply with the provisions of this Act and apply
for an Illinois license or permit.
8. An engineer, conductor, brakeman, or any other member of the
crew of a locomotive or train being operated upon rails,
including operation on a railroad crossing over a public street,
road or highway. Such person is not required to display a
driver's license to any law enforcement officer in connection
with the operation of a locomotive or train within this State.
The provisions of this Section granting exemption to any
nonresident shall be operative to the same extent that the laws
of the State or country of such nonresident grant like exemption
to residents of this State.
The Secretary of State may implement the exemption provisions of
this Section by inclusion thereof in a reciprocity agreement,
arrangement or declaration issued pursuant to this Act.
(Source: P.A. 86-1258.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-112) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-112)
Sec. 6-112. License and Permits to be carried
and
exhibited on demand. Every
licensee or permittee shall have his
drivers license or permit in his immediate possession at all
times when operating a motor vehicle and, for the purpose of
indicating compliance with this requirement, shall display such
license or permit if it is in his possession
upon demand
made, when in uniform or displaying a badge or other sign of
authority, by a member of the State Police, a sheriff or other
police officer or designated agent of the Secretary of State.
However, no person charged with violating this Section shall be
convicted if he produces in court satisfactory evidence that a
drivers license was theretofor issued to him and was valid at
the time of his arrest.
For the purposes of this Section, "display" means the manual
surrender of his license certificate into the hands of the
demanding officer for his inspection thereof.
(Source: P.A. 76-1749.)
(625 ILCS 5/6-601) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-601)
Sec. 6-601. Penalties.
(a) It is a petty offense for any person to violate any of the
provisions of this Chapter unless such violation is by this Code
or other law of this State declared to be a misdemeanor or a
felony.
(b) General penalties. Unless another penalty is in this Code or
other laws of this State, every person convicted of a petty
offense for the violation of any provision of this Chapter shall
be punished by a fine of not more than $500.
(c) Unlicensed driving. Except as hereinafter provided a
violation of Section 6-101 shall be:
1. A Class A misdemeanor if the person failed to obtain a
driver's license or permit after expiration of a period of
revocation.
2. A Class B misdemeanor if the person has been issued a
driver's license or permit, which has expired, and if the period
of expiration is greater than one year; or if the person has
never been issued a driver's license or permit, or is not
qualified to obtain a driver's license or permit because of his
age.
If a licensee under this Code is convicted of violating Section
6-101 for operating a motor vehicle during a time when such
licensee's driver's license was invalid under the provisions of
Section 6-110, then conviction under such circumstances shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than $25.
If a licensee under this Code is convicted of violating Section
6-303 for operating a motor vehicle during a time when such
licensee's driver's license was suspended under the provisions
of Section 6-306.3, then such act shall be a petty offense
(provided the licensee has answered the charge which was the
basis of the suspension under Section 6-306.3), and there shall
be imposed no additional like period of suspension as provided
in paragraph (b) of Section 6-303.
(Source: P.A. 92-622, eff. 1-1-03; 92-647, eff. 1-1-03; 92-883,
eff. 1-13-03.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-159) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-159)
Sec. 1-159. Person.
Every
natural person, firm, copartnership, association or
corporation.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-173) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-173)
Sec. 1-173. Resident.
(a) Every
natural person who
resides in
this state shall be deemed a
resident of
this State.
(b) In the case of a firm, copartnership or association, if the
principal place of business of such firm, copartnership or
association is located in the State of Illinois, then such firm,
copartnership or association shall be deemed a resident of the
State of Illinois.
(c) In the case of a corporation, if the corporation was
incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois or if the
principal place of business of such corporation is in the State
of Illinois, then such corporation shall be deemed a resident of
the State of Illinois.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-195) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-195)
Sec. 1-195. State.
A state, territory or possession of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a
province of the Dominion of Canada.
(Source: P.A. 76-1586.)
(625 ILCS 5/1-138.1) (from Ch. 95
1/2, par. 1-138.1)
Sec. 1-138.1. Licensee. A person licensed or required to be
licensed under Sections
5-101,
5-102,
5-201
and
5-301 of this Code.
(Source: P.A. 83-1473.)
(625 ILCS 5/Ch. 5 Art. I heading)
ARTICLE I. DEALERS
(625 ILCS 5/5-101) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-101)
Sec. 5-101. New vehicle dealers must be licensed.
(625 ILCS 5/5-102) (from Ch. 95
1/2, par. 5-102)
Sec. 5-102. Used vehicle dealers must be licensed.
(625 ILCS 5/Ch. 5 Art. II heading)
ARTICLE II. TRANSPORTERS
(625 ILCS 5/5-201) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-201)
Sec. 5-201. Transporters must apply for in-transit plates.
(625 ILCS 5/Ch. 5 Art. III heading)
ARTICLE III. USED PARTS DEALERS, SCRAP
PROCESSORS, AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
RECYCLERS AND REBUILDERS
(625 ILCS 5/5-301) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 5-301)
Sec. 5-301. Automotive parts recyclers, scrap processors,
repairers and rebuilders must be licensed.
Operating uninsured vehicle
(625 ILCS 5/3-707) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par.
3-707)
Sec. 3-707. Operation of uninsured motor vehicle - penalty.
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor
vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy in accordance
with
Section 7-601 of this Code.
(b) Any person who
fails to comply with a request by
a law enforcement officer for display of evidence of insurance,
as required under
Section 7-602 of this Code, shall be deemed to be operating
an uninsured motor vehicle.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (c-5), any operator of a
motor vehicle subject to registration under this Code who is
convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a business
offense and shall be required to pay a fine in excess of $500,
but not more than $1,000. However, no person charged with
violating this Section shall be convicted if such person
produces in court satisfactory evidence that at the time of the
arrest the motor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance
policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. The chief
judge of each circuit may designate an officer of the court to
review the documentation demonstrating that at the time of
arrest the motor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance
policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code.
(c-1) A person convicted of violating this Section shall also
have his or her driver's license, permit, or privileges
suspended for 3 months. After the expiration of the 3 months,
the person's driver's license, permit, or privileges shall not
be reinstated until he or she has paid a reinstatement fee of
$100. If a person violates this Section while his or her
driver's license, permit, or privileges are suspended under this
subsection (c-1), his or her driver's license, permit, or
privileges shall be suspended for an additional 6 months and
until he or she pays the reinstatement fee.
(c-5) A person who (i) has not previously been convicted of or
received a disposition of court supervision for violating this
Section and (ii) produces at his or her court appearance
satisfactory evidence that the motor vehicle is covered, as of
the date of the court appearance, by a liability insurance
policy in accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code shall, for
a violation of this Section, pay a fine of $100 and receive a
disposition of court supervision. The person must, on the date
that the period of court supervision is scheduled to terminate,
produce satisfactory evidence that the vehicle was covered by
the required liability insurance policy during the entire period
of court supervision.
An officer of the court designated under subsection (c) may also
review liability insurance documentation under this subsection
(c-5) to determine if the motor vehicle is, as of the date of
the court appearance, covered by a liability insurance policy in
accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code. The officer of the
court shall also determine, on the date the period of court
supervision is scheduled to terminate, whether the vehicle was
covered by the required policy during the entire period of court
supervision.
(d) A person convicted a third or subsequent time of violating
this Section or a similar provision of a local ordinance must
give proof to the Secretary of State of the person's financial
responsibility as defined in Section 7-315. The person must
maintain the proof in a manner satisfactory to the Secretary for
a minimum period of 3 years after the date the proof is first
filed. The Secretary must suspend the driver's license of any
person determined by the Secretary not to have provided adequate
proof of financial responsibility as required by this
subsection.
(Source: P.A. 94-1035, eff. 7-1-07; 95-211, eff. 1-1-08; 95-686,
eff. 6-1-08; 95-876, eff. 8-21-08.)
(625 ILCS 5/7-602) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 7-602)
Sec. 7-602. Insurance card. Every operator of a motor vehicle
subject to Section 7-601 of this Code shall carry within the
vehicle evidence of insurance. The evidence shall be legible and
sufficient to demonstrate that the motor vehicle currently is
covered by a liability insurance policy as required under
Section 7-601 of this Code and may include, but is not limited
to, the following:
(a) an insurance card provided by the insurer under this
Section;
(b) the combination of proof of purchase of the motor vehicle
within the previous 60 days and a current insurance card issued
for the motor vehicle replaced by such purchase;
(c) the current declarations page of a liability insurance
policy;
(d) a liability insurance binder, certificate of liability
insurance or receipt for payment to an insurer or its authorized
representative for a liability insurance premium, provided such
document contains all information the Secretary of State by rule
and regulation may require;
(e) a current rental agreement;
(f) registration plates, registration sticker or other evidence
of registration issued by the Secretary only upon submission of
proof of liability insurance pursuant to this Code;
(g) a certificate, decal, or other document or device issued by
a governmental agency for a motor vehicle indicating the vehicle
is insured for liability pursuant to law.
An insurance card shall be provided for each motor vehicle
insured by the insurer issuing the liability insurance policy.
The form, contents and manner of issuance of the insurance card
shall be prescribed by rules and regulations of the Secretary of
State. The Secretary shall adopt rules requiring that reasonable
measures be taken to prevent the fraudulent production of
insurance cards. The insurance card shall display an effective
date and an expiration date covering a period of time not to
exceed 12 months. The insurance card shall contain the following
disclaimer: "Examine policy exclusions carefully. This form does
not constitute any part of your insurance policy." If the
insurance policy represented by the insurance card does not
cover any driver operating the motor vehicle with the owner's
permission, or the owner when operating a motor vehicle other
than the vehicle for which the policy is issued, the insurance
card shall contain a warning of such limitations in the coverage
provided by the policy.
No insurer shall issue a card, similar in appearance, form and
content to the insurance card required under this Section, in
connection with an insurance policy that does not provide the
liability insurance coverage required under Section 7-601 of
this Code.
The evidence of insurance
shall be displayed upon
request made by any law enforcement officer wearing a uniform or
displaying a badge or other sign of authority. Any
person who fails or refuses to comply with such request is in
violation of Section 3-707 of this Code. Any person who displays
evidence of insurance, knowing there is no valid liability
insurance in effect on the motor vehicle as required under
Section 7-601 of this Code or knowing the evidence of insurance
is illegally altered, counterfeit or otherwise invalid, is in
violation of Section 3-710 of this Code.
"Display" means the manual surrender of the evidence of
insurance into the hands of the law enforcement officer, court,
or officer of the court making the request for the officer's,
court's, or officer of the court's inspection thereof.
(Source: P.A. 93-719, eff. 1-1-05.)
Form of Charge
(725 ILCS 5/111-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 111-3)
Sec. 111-3. Form of charge.
(a) A
charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an
offense by:
(1) Stating the name of the
offense;
(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been
violated;
(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the
offense
charged;
(4) Stating the date and county of the
offense as definitely as
can be done; and
(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known,
designate the accused by any name or description by which he can
be identified with reasonable certainty.
(b) An indictment shall be signed by the foreman of the Grand
Jury and an
information shall be signed by the State's Attorney
and sworn to by him or another. A
complaint shall be sworn to
and signed by the complainant; Provided, however, that when a
citation is issued on a Uniform Traffic Ticket or Uniform
Conservation Ticket (in a form prescribed by the Conference of
Chief Circuit Judges and filed with the Supreme Court), the copy
of such Uniform Ticket which is filed with the circuit court
constitutes a
complaint to which the defendant may plead, unless
he specifically requests that a verified complaint be filed.
(c) When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior
conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an
enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to
give notice to the defendant. However, the fact of such prior
conviction and the State's intention to seek an enhanced
sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be
disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise permitted by
issues properly raised during such trial. For the purposes of
this Section, "enhanced sentence" means a sentence which is
increased by a prior conviction from one classification of
offense to another higher level classification of offense set
forth in Section 5-5-1 of the "Unified Code of Corrections",
approved July 26, 1972, as amended; it does not include an
increase in the sentence applied within the same level of
classification of offense.
(c-5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all cases
in which the imposition of the death penalty is not a
possibility, if an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior
conviction) is not an element of an offense but is sought to be
used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the
offense, the alleged fact must be included in the charging
instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a
written notification before trial, submitted to a trier of fact
as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Failure to prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt is not a bar
to a conviction for commission of the offense, but is a bar to
increasing, based on that fact, the range of penalties for the
offense beyond the statutory maximum that could otherwise be
imposed for that offense. Nothing in this subsection (c-5)
requires the imposition of a sentence that increases the range
of penalties for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that
could otherwise be imposed for the offense if the imposition of
that sentence is not required by law.
(d) At any time prior to trial, the State on motion shall be
permitted to amend the charge, whether brought by indictment,
information or complaint, to make the charge comply with
subsection (c) or (c-5) of this Section. Nothing in Section
103-5 of this Code precludes such an amendment or a written
notification made in accordance with subsection (c-5) of this
Section.
(e) The provisions of Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961,
as amended, shall not be affected by this Section.
(Source: P.A. 91-953, eff. 2-23-01.)
(725 ILCS 5/102‑8) (from Ch. 38, par.
102‑8)
Sec. 102‑8. "Charge".
"Charge" means a written statement presented to a court
accusing a person of the commission of an offense and includes
complaint, information and indictment.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/102‑9) (from Ch. 38,
par. 102‑9)
Sec. 102‑9. "Complaint".
"Complaint" means a verified written statement other
than an information or an indictment, presented to a court,
which charges the commission of an offense.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/102‑12) (from
Ch. 38, par. 102‑12)
Sec. 102‑12. "Information".
"Information" means a verified written statement signed
by a State's Attorney, and presented to a court, which charges
the commission of an offense.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/102‑15) (from Ch.
38, par. 102‑15)
Sec. 102‑15. "Offense".
"Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of
this State.
(Source: P.A. 76‑1796.)
Relating to Search and Seizure
(725 ILCS 5/Art. 108 heading)
ARTICLE 108. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
(725 ILCS 5/108-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-1)
Sec. 108-1. Search without warrant.
(1) When a lawful arrest is effected a peace officer may
reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such
person's immediate presence for the purpose of:
(a) protecting the officer from attack; or
(b) preventing the person from escaping; or
(c) discovering the fruits of the crime; or
(d) discovering any instruments, articles, or things which may
have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute
evidence of, an offense.
(2) (Blank).
(3) A law enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor
vehicle, its contents, the driver, or a passenger solely because
of a violation of Section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(Source: P.A. 93-99, eff. 7-3-03.)
(725 ILCS 5/108-1.01) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-1.01)
Sec. 108-1.01. Search during temporary questioning.
When a peace officer has stopped a person for temporary
questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and
reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of attack,
he may search the person for weapons. If the officer discovers a
weapon, he may take it until the completion of the questioning,
at which time he shall either return the weapon, if lawfully
possessed, or arrest the person so questioned.
(Source: Laws 1968, p. 218.)
(725 ILCS 5/108-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 108-2)
Sec. 108-2. Custody and disposition of things seized.
An inventory of all instruments, articles or things seized on a
search without warrant shall be given to the person arrested and
a copy thereof delivered to the judge before whom the person
arrested is taken, and thereafter, such instruments, articles or
things shall be handled and disposed of in accordance with
Sections 108--11 and 108--12 of this Code. If the person
arrested is released without a charge being preferred against
him all instruments, articles or things seized, other than
contraband, shall be returned to him upon release.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/Art. 103 heading)
ARTICLE 103. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
(725 ILCS 5/103-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-1)
Sec. 103-1. Rights on arrest. (a) After an arrest on a warrant
the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested
that a warrant has been issued for his arrest and the nature of
the offense specified in the warrant.
(b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the
arrest shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the
offense on which the arrest is based.
(c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor
offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled
substance, shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable
belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled
substance.
(d) "Strip search" means having an arrested person remove or
arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a
visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female
breasts or undergarments of such person.
(e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be
performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and
on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not
physically conducting the search.
(f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department
conducting a strip search shall:
(1) Obtain the written permission of the police commander or an
agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip
search in accordance with this Section.
(2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall
include the written authorization required by paragraph (1) of
this subsection (f), the name of the person subjected to the
search, the names of the persons conducting the search, and the
time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall
be provided to the person subject to the search.
(g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be
conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant
authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search
must be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either
by or under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice
medicine in all of its branches in this State.
(h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally
fails to comply with any provision of this Section is guilty of
official misconduct as provided in Section 103-8; provided
however, that nothing contained in this Section shall preclude
prosecution of a peace officer or employee under another section
of this Code.
(i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any
statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any
civil action or injunctive relief.
(j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this
Section shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by
or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant
to a court order.
(Source: P.A. 81-1509.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-2)
Sec. 103-2. Treatment while in custody.
(a) On being taken into custody every person shall have the
right to remain silent.
(b) No unlawful means of any kind shall be used to obtain a
statement, admission or confession from any person in custody.
(c) Persons in custody shall be treated humanely and provided
with proper food, shelter and, if required, medical treatment.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-2.1)
Sec. 103-2.1. When statements by accused may be used.
(a) In this Section, "custodial interrogation" means any
interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the
subject's position would consider himself or herself to be in
custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
In this Section, "place of detention" means a building or a
police station that is a place of operation for a municipal
police department or county sheriff department or other law
enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that is owned or operated
by a law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held
in detention in connection with criminal charges against those
persons.
In this Section, "electronic recording" includes motion picture,
audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording.
(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused
made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police
station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be
inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal
proceeding brought under Section 9-1, 9-1.2, 9-2, 9-2.1, 9-3,
9-3.2, or 9-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or under clause
(d)(1)(F) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unless:
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial
interrogation; and
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not
intentionally altered.
(c) Every electronic recording required under this Section must
be preserved until such time as the defendant's conviction for
any offense relating to the statement is final and all direct
and habeas corpus appeals are exhausted, or the prosecution of
such offenses is barred by law.
(d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in
violation of this Section, then any statements made by the
defendant during or following that non-recorded custodial
interrogation, even if otherwise in compliance with this
Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in any criminal
proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of
impeachment.
(e) Nothing in this Section precludes the admission (i) of a
statement made by the accused in open court at his or her trial,
before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing, (ii) of a
statement made during a custodial interrogation that was not
recorded as required by this Section, because electronic
recording was not feasible, (iii) of a voluntary statement,
whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has
a bearing on the credibility of the accused as a witness, (iv)
of a spontaneous statement that is not made in response to a
question, (v) of a statement made after questioning that is
routinely asked during the processing of the arrest of the
suspect, (vi) of a statement made during a custodial
interrogation by a suspect who requests, prior to making the
statement, to respond to the interrogator's questions only if an
electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided that
an electronic recording is made of the statement of agreeing to
respond to the interrogator's question, only if a recording is
not made of the statement, (vii) of a statement made during a
custodial interrogation that is conducted out-of-state, (viii)
of a statement given at a time when the interrogators are
unaware that a death has in fact occurred, or (ix) of any other
statement that may be admissible under law. The State shall bear
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
one of the exceptions described in this subsection (e) is
applicable. Nothing in this Section precludes the admission of a
statement, otherwise inadmissible under this Section, that is
used only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence.
(f) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a
suspect at a custodial interrogation at a police station or
other place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of
the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is
reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.
(g) Any electronic recording of any statement made by an accused
during a custodial interrogation that is compiled by any law
enforcement agency as required by this Section for the purposes
of fulfilling the requirements of this Section shall be
confidential and exempt from public inspection and copying, as
provided under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, and
the information shall not be transmitted to anyone except as
needed to comply with this Section.
(Source: P.A. 93-206, eff. 7-18-05; 93-517, eff. 8-6-05; 94-117,
eff. 7-5-05.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-3)
Sec. 103-3. Right to communicate with attorney and family;
transfers.
(a) Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate
with an attorney of their choice and a member of their family by
making a reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other
reasonable manner. Such communication shall be permitted within
a reasonable time after arrival at the first place of custody.
(b) In the event the accused is transferred to a new place of
custody his right to communicate with an attorney and a member
of his family is renewed.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-4)
Sec. 103-4. Right to consult with attorney.
Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty
for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged
with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of
escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law
of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult,
alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and
for such period each time as is reasonable. When any such person
is about to be moved beyond the limits of this State under any
pretense whatever the person to be moved shall be entitled to a
reasonable delay for the purpose of obtaining counsel and of
availing himself of the laws of this State for the security of
personal liberty.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)
Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense
shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days
from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is
occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness
ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a
continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after
a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity
for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be
considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she
objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an
oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this
subsection (a) do not apply to a person on bail or recognizance
for an offense but who is in custody for a violation of his or
her parole or mandatory supervised release for another offense.
The 120-day term must be one continuous period of incarceration.
In computing the 120-day term, separate periods of incarceration
may not be combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a
second (or subsequent) time for the same offense, the term will
begin again at day zero.
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the
court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date
defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to
Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an
adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial,
or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure to appear
for any court date set by the court operates to waive the
defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.
For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this
subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged
offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on bail
or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit for
time spent in custody following the making of the demand while
in custody. Any demand for trial made under this subsection (b)
shall be in writing; and in the case of a defendant not in
custody, the demand for trial shall include the date of any
prior demand made under this provision while the defendant was
in custody.
(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without
success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue
the cause on application of the State for not more than an
additional 60 days. If the court determines that the State has
exercised without success due diligence to obtain results of DNA
testing that is material to the case and that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained
at a later day, the court may continue the cause on application
of the State for not more than an additional 120 days.
(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a),
(b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or
released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one
charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously
demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in
the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after
waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration
relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed
by subsections (a) and (b) of this Section. Such person shall be
tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160
days from the date on which judgment relative to the first
charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code
of Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is
terminated without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of,
or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first
charge within a reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon
all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from
the date on which such trial is terminated; if either such
period of 160 days expires without the commencement of trial of,
or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such
remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be
dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is
occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness
ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a
continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after
a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity
for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided, however,
that if the court determines that the State has exercised
without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the
case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue
the cause on application of the State for not more than an
additional 60 days.
(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend
for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall
be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this
Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said
period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended.
Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the end of the period
within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by
subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court may
continue the cause on application of the State for not more than
an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by
subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection (f) shall become
effective on, and apply to persons charged with alleged offenses
committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
(Source: P.A. 94-1094, eff. 1-26-07.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-6)
Sec. 103-6. Waiver of jury trial. Every person accused of an
offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i)
understandingly waived by defendant in open court or (ii) the
offense is an ordinance violation punishable by fine only and
the defendant either fails to file a demand for a trial by jury
at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty or fails
to pay to the clerk of the circuit court at the time of entering
his or her plea of not guilty any jury fee required to be paid
to the clerk.
(Source: P.A. 86-1386.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-7)
Sec. 103-7. Posting notice of rights.
Every sheriff, chief of police or other person who is in charge
of any jail, police station or other building where persons
under arrest are held in custody pending investigation, bail or
other criminal proceedings, shall post in every room, other than
cells, of such buildings where persons are held in custody, in
conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in
custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing
a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of
Sections 103-2, 103-3, 103-4, 109-1, 110-2, 110-4, and sub-parts
(a) and (b) of Sections 110-7 and 113-3 of this Code. Each
person who is in charge of any courthouse or other building in
which any trial of an offense is conducted shall post in each
room primarily used for such trials and in each room in which
defendants are confined or wait, pending trial, in conspicuous
places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and
others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim
copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections
103-6, 113-1, 113-4 and 115-1 and of subparts (a) and (b) of
Section 113-3 of this Code.
(Source: Laws 1965, p. 2622.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-8) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-8)
Sec. 103-8. Mandatory duty of officers.
Any peace officer who intentionally prevents the exercise by an
accused of any right conferred by this Article or who
intentionally fails to perform any act required of him by this
Article shall be guilty of official misconduct and may be
punished in accordance with Section 33-3 of the "Criminal Code
of 1961" approved July 28, 1961, as heretofore and hereafter
amended.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)
(725 ILCS 5/103-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-9)
Sec. 103-9. Bail bondsmen. No bail bondsman from any state may
seize or transport unwillingly any person found in this State
who is allegedly in violation of a bail bond posted in some
other state. The return of any such person to another state may
be accomplished only as provided by the laws of this State. Any
bail bondsman who violates this Section is fully subject to the
criminal and civil penalties provided by the laws of this State
for his actions.
(Source: P.A. 84-694.)
